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Abstract
This study examines the effects of economic integration on Greenfield Investments
and cross-border Acquisitions locations. First, we present a simple theoretical three countries
Insider – Outsider model framework highlighting differences between the two modes of entry.
In a second part, we use panel data on U.S. FDI in NAFTA and MERCOSUR members from
1989 to 1998. Economic integration is captured through bilateral tariff barriers and dummy
variables (date of implementation of treaties). We pool data to distinguish between the two
agreements. We also control for traditional macroeconomic determinants. It is found that
economic integration certainly played a major role on U.S. firms’ location patterns. The U.S.
position regarding to the two agreements–insiders vs. outsider- seemed to matter. Moreover,
both our empirical study and our theoretical model underline the relevance of separating entry
modes when studying FDI. Entry mode reactions to changes in macroeconomic host country
environment are likely to be differentiated by their location of origin.
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I. Introduction
Over the last decade, we attended a dramatic surge in outward U.S. FDI (Foreign
Direct Investment) within the American continent. The U.S. FDI rose from 119 311 million
                                               
* We are very grateful to JC. Berthelemy, L. Fontagné, G. Hillcoat, S. Jean, R. Mataloni, D. Misiuk, JL.
Mucchielli, M. Sollogoub and S. Zignago for providing data and useful comments.
‡ TEAM, Université Paris I Sorbonne et CNRS. Email : nicole.madariaga@malix.univ-paris1.fr;
olivier.bertrand@malix.univ-paris1.fr2
U.S. dollars in 1988 to 294 955 in 1998
1. U.S. firms mainly invested in four main countries:
Canada, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. These four countries accounted for more than a half of
this growth. In the same period, two major regional areas - the MERCOSUR (Mercado
Comun del Sur) in 1991 and the NAFTA (North America Free trade agreement) a few years
later in 1994 - emerged.
At first sight, an interesting parallel between this expansion of U.S. companies and the
official signature of these two treaties could be drawn. However, stylised facts give no clear
evidence of a link between economic integration and U.S. companies’ location choices. FDI
in Mexico and Canada
2 seem to have considerably increased before the signature of the
NAFTA although U.S. outward FDI flows in Mexico
3 reached their highest point after 1994
(Blomström and Kokko (1997)). Besides, a boom in U.S. FDI occurred after the
MERCOSUR signature (a rise by 10% in Argentina and Brazil in 1991). But inward FDI
flows towards the MERCOSUR countries had already increased before the implementation of
the treaty.
Many other host country characteristics such as market size, factors costs, exchange
rate or for example research and development expenditures can explain FDI location choices.
However, the economic integration process can theoretically alter location activity patterns
and industrial structures (Barrell and Pain (1996), (1999)). Several empirical studies confirm
such influence. For instance, at macroeconomic level, Clegg and Scott-Green (1999a; see also
1998 and 1999b) put forward the role of European integration as a main determinant of
Japanese and U.S. FDI among EU members
4.
Thus, as a first step, our econometric analysis aims to separate the effects of economic
integration from other macroeconomic parameters influencing U.S. FDI location in Canada,
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil over the years 1989-1998. We apply fixed effect (within)
regression estimator to deal with panel data. Different measures are used with a view to
capture economic integration: transaction costs (bilateral tariff barriers) and dummy variables
referring to the date of implementation of the MERCOSUR and the NAFTA.
                                               
1 These figures are evaluated on a historical-cost basis (BEA). They include Canada, Latin America and other
Western Hemisphere.
2 Canada and the U.S. were deeply integrated in 1988 when they decided to sign for CUSFTA (Canada – United
States Free Trade Agreement).
3 First reforms promoting inward FDI in Mexico took place in the middle of the eighties.
4 See also appendix C for further location choices literature.3
Furthermore, the regional integration impact on bilateral FDI also depends on whether
the source country is a member of the integrated regional area (insider) or not (outsider).
There is no reason to think that the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR have the same impact since
in the former case, the U.S. is an insider whereas in the latter one, it is an outsider. Strategic
reactions of insiders and outsiders can be contrasted
5. Moreover, institutionalised agreements
can entail discriminatory measures against outsiders. By introducing NAFTA and
MERCOSUR dummies, we indicate if belonging to the NAFTA, and not to the MERCOSUR,
modifies U.S. location decisions. Besides, data are pooled in such a way that MERCOSUR
and NAFTA differences are investigated. U.S. investors could be differently influenced by
macroeconomic determinants in each trade area.
Assessing the role of regional integration in FDI location is an increasingly relevant
issue: all American continent countries are currently under negotiations to constitute
progressively a free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. It is especially true for
American continental emerging countries, U.S. FDI being a major source of foreign
financing. The FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) should be signed by the year
2005.
Nevertheless, it would be insufficient to only analyse aggregate FDI flows. Indeed,
Greenfield Investments (G.I.)
6 and cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) are two
distinct ways of entering a foreign market. Some authors have examined the determinants of
the G.I. vs. cross-border M&A trade-off. The first major study
7 on such a trade-off goes back
to Caves and Mehra in 1986. The related literature usually deals with industry and firm-
specific determinants. Other authors
8 such as Balwin and Gorecki (1987) have evaluated
separately and then compare the effects of some economic factors on each mode of entry.
Almost none of the previous studies has clearly tackled the issue of M&A and G.I.
locations apart from O’Huallachain and Reid in 1997 (Japanese companies’ location in U.S.
                                               
5 For a discussion, see for instance Buckley and al. (1999) in international business or Norman and Motta (1993,
1996) for more formalized game theory analysis.
6 We can define Greenfield Investment as the establishment of a new production facility in contrast to cross-
border Merger & Acquisition where a firm purchases shares of an existing foreign firm.
7 See also: Kogut and Singh (1988), Hennart and Park (1993) or e.g. Andersson and Swensson (1996).
8 See also e.g. Froot and Stein (1991) or above all Girma (2001). He assesses the impact of the European Internal
Market programme on the determinants of non-European companies locating in the United Kingdom.4
counties). However, analysing these two entry modes location decisions has become a central
question in the last decade since in most cases, countries struggle for attracting FDI.
At the opposite, the FDI location literature in international economics traditionally
assumes that FDI can be viewed as G.I. As Lipsey (2000) rightly points out, M&A should be
better considered to understand the industrial globalization process occurring in developed
and developing countries. Indeed, cross-border M&A represent almost 85% of worldwide
FDI transactions value in 2000. The total number of cross-border M&A has grown very
quickly over the period 1991-1998. It has gone up from 4 149 transactions in 1991 to 5 373
transactions in 1998 (with a peak of 6 310 in 1995). Besides, from a theoretical point of view,
M&A and G.I. should not respond similarly to traditional investment determinants.
In this article we relax both empirically and theoretically this traditional assumption by
examining separately G.I. and cross border M&A. Again, such a distinction may imply
important consequences in terms of economic policy. G.I. and M&A are intended to induce
different impacts on host country welfare, at least in short term (see WIR (2000)).
The paper proceeds as following: in the section II, we present a simple theoretical
framework stressing the difference between G.I and M&A according to the Insider vs.
Outsider position. Then, section III reports the econometric method and the variables used.
Finally, before concluding, section IV discusses the empirical findings.
II. The model
This section does not provide a full model of FDI locations. It only aims to provide
theoretical evidence concerning the hypothesis that horizontal
9 M&A and G.I may not be
sensible to traditional FDI location determinants identically. We also show formally that entry
mode incentives depend on the insider vs. outsider position.
In such a context, we adopt a modified version of the Norman and Motta’s partial
equilibrium model framework (1996) introducing cross-border M&A strategies. We consider
three countries noted H  (host country), I  (insider country) and O (outsider country). These
three countries contain respectively  I H n n ,  and  O n  existing firms. We respectively note I  and
O parent companies in insider and outsider countries
                                               
9 In 1999, 70% of cross-border M&A value corresponded to horizontal FDI. Vertical M&A never exceeded 10%
of total M&A.5
Countries H  and I are involved in a regional agreement. The country O is described
as an outsider. We distinguish intra-regional transaction costs  1 u  from extra-regional
transaction costs  2 u  (see figure 1) by setting  1 2 u u > . Transaction costs include not only tariff
and non tariff barriers to trade but also transport costs.
Figure 1: An insider/outsider three country Model
In a country h(with { } O I H h , , = ), the inverse demand for homogeneous goods is
linear and is written: 
h
i
h h q a p - =  where 
h
i q  is the production sold by a firm i in the market
h. 
h a  represents its market size. The marginal production cost 
h c  in country h is constant.
We suppose Cournot competition takes place when firms meet each others in a market
10.
We only pay attention to the effect on FDI location of a change in host country market
characteristics. Without loss of generality
11, we do not take into account sales in market O.
We normalize country I  and country O parameters by setting  0 , 1 = = =
O I I c c a
and 1 = =
O I n n . We also abstract any investment strategic interaction from our model to
strictly focus on FDI incentives intrinsic to host country characteristics. Only the firm located
in O or I  can invest abroad. Host country firms in H cannot engage in foreign investment.
Finally, to simplify notation, we note a a
H = ,  c c
H =  and n n
H = .
The foreign firm i (with { } O I i , = ) can enter the host market H  by two ways: G.I. and
M&A. We assess the profit gained by the firm i when investing in the country H .
                                               
10 In economic geographic models, the assumption of numerous firms leads to neglect any form of strategic
interaction. We adopt a Cournot competition model to remedy it. Kreps and Sheikman (1983) showed that the







Case one: Greenfield Investment. An investing firm avoids transaction costs by
establishing a plant in the host market but has to incur an exogenous plant-level fixed cost i F .
The insider firm saves transaction cost in H  (tariff-jumping argument) whereas the outsider
firm benefits from both a better access in H  (tariff-jumping argument) and I  (export
platform motive). The outsider removes higher transaction costs in H . In addition, it now
exports to I  from H  at a lesser transaction cost  1 u  since  1 2 u u > . By locating in H , it
benefits from an improved market access in I  (see Neary (2002)). The profit of the investing
firm i is written:
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Case two: Cross-border acquisition. The acquisition of a host country firm allows the
investing firm i to benefit both from efficiency gains and a rise in its market power. Firstly,
M&A imply rationalization gains
12. The investing firm can rationalize output across its plants
by transferring production from a lesser efficient factory to a more efficient one. Such gains
are more important for the outsider firm which can take profit from production rationalization
both in market H and I  (tariff-jumping and platform motives). Secondly, M&A also reduces
competition. It increases its mark-up in market H  and I .
But, taking over a local firm incurs an endogenously acquisition price  i R  where
{ } O I i , = . We model negotiations between a buyer and its seller in a simple way. We assume
the “take-or-leave-it” standard hypothesis. The foreign firm i proposes an acquisition price to
                                                                                                                                                  
11 Markets are segmented both at the demand and cost side.7
a host country firm
13. The latter takes or refuses the proposition. The negotiation power of this
host firm is then limited. However, it does not accept any price. It claims a minimum price
corresponding to the profit it would gain if it refused to be sold. Thus  i R  equals to the profit
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We further set  j u c >  with  { } 2 , 1 = j . It is a sufficient but not necessary condition of profitability
in markets H and I  whatever the status of the foreign firm is. It guarantees a non-prohibitive
acquisition price. Let us study for instance the market H . The insider (resp. outsider) is more
competitive than a host firm even if it prefers to export, since  1 u c >  (resp. 2 u c > ). It therefore
prevents the local firm from claiming a high compensation price in market H .
The profit of the home country firm in the host country is the following:
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We set additional constraints on parameters value in order to exclude negative production
levels. We calculate market and profit equilibriums. We then derive equations (1), (2), (3) and
(4) to the variables  1 , , , u n c a  and  2 u . The Table 1 summarizes the effect of these factors on
FDI location strategy
15. It can be negative, positive or unspecified.
                                                                                                                                                  
12 We assume no synergy gains. Marginal costs of the new entity are unchanged.
13 All local target firms are symmetric.
14 When no FDI takes place, we suppose reciprocal exports between countries  H  and  I . The outsider firm
exports to both countries in this regional area (see figure 1).
15 Further information are available on authors’ request.8
In the G.I. case, signs of derivatives are clear and conform to intuition
16 except in a
very few cases. A rise in c has a compound effect on the insider: once it is located in the host
country H , the affiliate profit decreases in market H . However, the profit earned by the
parent company in market I  goes up.
Table 1: Some expected signs on FDI location choices
G.I. M&A Factors
Outsider Insider Outsider Insider
a + + + +
c - ? ? ?
n - - - -
u1 ? + ? ?
u2 0 + - +
For an outsider, a worsening in market accessibility (a rise in 1 u ) also has an uncertain
outcome. Indeed, it increases its competitiveness in H  but reduces it in market I , since it
now exports to market I  from production base set up in H . Such effects do not play on the
insider. A rise in  1 u  increases its profit in market  I  (growth in its competitiveness). However,
it does not affect its situation in market H . In H , it is now sheltered from variations in
transaction cost  1 u .
When external barriers to trade  2 u  go up, it does not modify the outsider profit since it
is now located inH . At the opposite, it improves the insider profit by worsening the
competitiveness of the firm O established outside the regional area.
Consider the cross-border M&A strategy. Signs are more often not definite for M&A
than for G.I. To see why, let us examine the consequences of a rise in c on the outsider firm.
It decreases not only the gross profit in market H  and I  but also the acquisition price
claimed by a host country firm so that the outcome reveals to be indeterminate. The same
mechanism applies to a change in  1 u . The situation is still more complicated since the
acquisition price variation is unspecified. When the insider or outsider firm exports and no
FDI takes place, the profit of a host country firm in market H  and I  varies with  1 u  but in an
opposite way.
                                               
16 The parameter n  only plays competition effects. It improves competition in market  H  and  I , which entails a
drop in mark-ups. We have ignored agglomeration effects in this paper for tractability purposes.9
Furthermore, increasing extra-regional trade barriers  2 u  influences only the outsider
location. It protects firms in market H  from the outsider foreign competition. Thus, it
enhances their rents if they refuse to be sold compelling the outsider to serve this market
through exports. As a result, the acquisition price grows and the net profit of the outsider
decreases. In other words, a decrease in  2 u  has a pro-competitive effect on host country
companies by intensifying export flows. This increasing competition could encourage firms to
merge in order to restore their market power. This search of market power could partly offset
lower transaction cost economies. Now, consider the insider once it penetrates the market H .
When  2 u  goes up, the rise in the acquisition price is overcome by larger profit earned by its
production plant both in market H  and I .
As this formal analysis suggests, we should expect contrasted FDI reactions to
changes in the host country economic environment. Such reactions depend both on entry
modes and insider vs. outsider position. In the next section, we will estimate empirically to
what extent U.S. aggregated FDI, G.I. and cross-border M&A respond to host country
characteristics.
III. Data and methodology
Now, we try to validate empirically some appealing theoretical intuitions we have
previously underlined. In this purpose, we analyse the impact of economic integration on both
U.S. G.I. and cross-border M&A while controlling for traditional FDI macroeconomic
determinants. We also wonder whether U.S Multinational firms react differently to the
formation of a trade area according to where they are located within (NAFTA) or outside the
trade area (MERCOSUR). As it can be observed in table 2, the NAFTA members attracted
the greatest part of U.S. G.I. and M&A among the four countries studied during the last
decade.
We analyse U.S. outward FDI towards the NAFTA (Canada and Mexico) and the
MERCOSUR (Argentina and Brazil) members over the period 1989-1998. Our dependent
variable is the number of new plant transactions in each country (decomposed into G.I. and
M&A). We have not searched for U.S. outward FDI data in value. Indeed, we are willing to
insist more on determinants of U.S. investors’ location choices than factors influencing FDI
transaction values in a given country.10
Empirical analyses separating G.I. and M&A focus very often on U.S. inward FDI. In
this paper, we enlarge the geographic area to the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR countries.
Unfortunately, U.S. outward FDI are recorded less exhaustively than U.S. inward FDI. This is
why our dataset is restricted in terms of period and countries collected
17.
Table 2: Share of U.S. G.I. and M&A in the MERCOSUR and the NAFTA
  G.I. share in total U.S. G.I. in % M&A share in total U.S. M&A in %
  Canada Mexico Brazil Argentina Canada Mexico Brazil Argentina
1989 66,67 6,67 20,00 6,67 66,67 16,67 13,33 3,33
1990 75,00 4,17 16,67 4,17 71,43 14,29 9,52 4,76
1991 80,00 10,00 5,00 5,00 36,36 45,45 9,09 9,09
1992 50,00 28,57 14,29 7,14 48,00 40,00 8,00 4,00
1993 63,16 26,32 5,26 5,26 25,00 50,00 10,00 15,00
1994 58,33 29,17 4,17 8,33 33,33 27,78 11,11 27,78
1995 55,17 24,14 13,79 6,90 45,00 5,00 20,00 30,00
1996 40,48 33,33 16,67 9,52 37,04 11,11 25,93 25,93
1997 30,30 9,09 39,39 21,21 36,00 10,00 20,00 34,00
1998 36,59 14,63 29,27 19,51 33,33 17,39 30,43 18,84
1989/98 51,72 19,16 18,39 10,73 41,92 20,27 18,90 18,56
Source: BEA- SCB, CEP. Authors’ calculations.
This paper only considers host country macroeconomic characteristics. Data per
country at sector level are not available. As a result, we implicitly assume that
macroeconomic factors account for the structure (intensity and orientation) of FDI flows
whereas microeconomic determinants give information on sectors and individual firms
engaged in industrial globalization. Descriptive statistics are presented in appendix B.
We proceed to a Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test to select our
econometric method. It detects unobservable characteristics between the four recipient
countries and checks the existence of heterogeneous individual data. The ÷² statistic informs
us on the relevance of panel estimation. FDI data yield a ÷² statistic equals to 0.87. We then
reject OLS estimator against random effects estimator
18. Choosing OLS would have lead to
                                               
17 Statistical offices in most countries (with the exception of the USA and Argentina) do not record the entry
mode. Consequently, the share of FDI flows accounted by G.I. or M&A must be inferred from different
statistical sources. Hence, getting very accurate estimation (WIR (2000)) is very difficult.
18 The ÷² statistics yielded by M&A and G.I. data are respectively 0.55 and 1.30.11
biased estimates because of correlations between unobserved country effects and observed
independent variables. Besides, we perform a Hausman (1978) test to determine whether a
random effect or a fixed effect specification is the more appropriate to estimate panel data.
The ÷² statistic is equal to 56.34. It supports the choice of a fixed effect estimator
19.
The estimation with fixed effects requires measuring the actual value for each year
less the mean value of all variables over the entire period. This estimation can then capture the
influence of the different mean levels across countries, i.e. fixed and unobserved countries
characteristics. Consequently, time invariant pair-specific variables such as common border,
geographic or cultural distance are subsumed in country pair fixed effects.
The basic full formulation of the log-linear model presented in section 3 is as follows:
lfdiit =ai + b1 lgdpit-1 + b2 laggit + b3 llcostit + b4 ltbit+ b5 mercosur+b6 nafta+uit    (5)
Where i=1,...,n represents the four recipient countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Mexico). t=1,...,T covers the relevant time period.
We compare the U.S. FDI regression to those of G.I. and M&A. We check if regarding
FDI exclusively as a G.I. is relevant or not. We also pool data according to NAFTA and
MERCOSUR membership. We detect by applying a Chow test whether the coefficients
estimated over one group are equal or not to the coefficients estimated over another one.
Our explanatory variables
20 are the following
21:
Market size (GDP): the GDP provides us a good proxy of the market size. We use
lagged GDP in order to avoid endogeneity effects between FDI and GDP. In economic
geography (Krugman (1991)) a huge market size means great local demand and easier outlet.
In addition, it allows companies to achieve economies of scale and to reach optimum scale. It
also leaves room for new factories and avoids a fall of prices when total industrial productive
capacity goes up. Hence, we expect market size to have a positive impact on U.S. FDI.
Agglomeration (AGG): the variable AGG estimates if past FDI (evaluated by the
number of U.S. affiliates in host countries in the previous year) lead to a persistence effect.
The new theories of international trade and economic geography (Fujita and al. (1999) for
instance) have stressed the role of agglomeration effects on firms’ location patterns. However,
                                               
19 The tests results are the same when we separate FDI data into M&A and G.I. The ÷² statistics are equal to
35.11 for M&A and 47.97 for G.I.
20 The exchange rate variable has been omitted since we converted all our data into U.S. dollar.
21 Data sources are available in appendix A.12
these effects are uncertain
22. Indeed, a greater number of firms in a given host country
exercises two opposite forces: a competition effect and positive externalities. On the one
hand, it increases competition between firms which deters them from locating in the host
country. On the second hand, it causes positive externalities by improving input markets
access (rise in available skilled labour force), strengthening technological spillovers or for
instance easing vertical input – output links with other firms (Venables (1996)).
Labour costs (LCOST): LCOST represents labour costs in the host country. Labour
costs are measured by nominal worker wages. A rise in labour costs may urge foreign firms to
export rather than locate abroad. All things being equal, foreign firms have fewer incentives
to locate abroad when host country labour costs increase.
Transaction costs proxied by bilateral Tariff Barrier (TB): Blomström and Kokko
(1997) underline two opposite consequences of a decrease in tariff barriers. If FDI is
motivated by a tariff-jumping argument or/and export platform motives, then regional
integration should decrease FDI flows and encourage cheaper exports. However, a reduction
in trade barriers could increase FDI if the major motive for internationalization is the
exploitation of intangible assets. Moreover, multinational firms try to rationalize their
production in the region, locating their plants in different countries to lower costs by
exploiting differences in factors endowments. Multinational firms take advantage of process
specialization (Buckley and al. (1999)). Furthermore, economic geography teaches us that a
fall in transaction costs intensifies the market size effects by raising agglomeration effects
23.
Date of implementation of treaties (MERCOSUR, NAFTA): we include dummy
variables to indicate the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR dates of implementation. The variable
MERCOSUR (resp. the variable NAFTA) takes the value 1 from 1991 (resp. 1994) to 1998
and 0 otherwise. These variables capture the evolution of rules on trade and investment.
Indeed, countries belonging to a regional agreement often make efforts to further reduce
transaction costs. They liberalize capital flows, homogenize legal norms, set up institutions
handling cross-border disputes, etc. (see Buckley and al. (1999) or for instance Levy-Yeyati
and al. (2002)). The impact of such a dummy on FDI partly depends on the insider vs.
outsider position.
                                               
22 Many empirical works have tested agglomeration effects on the location of U.S. companies. At a
macroeconomic level, see e.g. Barrell and Pain (1996, 1999) or Wheeler and Mody (1992). At a sectoral level,
see Mody and Srinivasan (1998) or Head and al. (1995).
23 This argument is not contradictory with the tariff jumping argument since the latter does not consider
agglomeration phenomena.13
IV. Empirical estimation
Table 3 presents estimation outcomes for FDI, M&A and G.I. regressions. Fisher
statistics support the global significance of our econometric models despite the weakness of R
squared due to our limited number of observations.
Table 3: FDI, G.I. and M&A regressions results over the period 1989-1998
  lfdi lma lgi
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
   lgdp 6.97*** 7.58*** 4.16*** 7.57*** 8.95*** 5.85*** 6.27*** 6.17*** 2.77*
  (0.942) (1.143) (1.192) (1.276) (1.505) (1.823) (1.243) (1.528) (1.604)
   lagg -0.327 -0.46 -0.38 -0.74 -1.05* -0.77 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12
  (0.404) (0.431) (0.355) (0.548) (0.568) (0.543) (0.534) (0.576) (0.477)
  llcost 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.043) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.057)
    ltb 0.42** 0.38* 0.72*** 0.49* 0.42 0.68** 0.25 0.26 0.63**
  (0.197) (0.200) 0.196 (0.267) (0.264) (0.300) (0.260) (0.268) (0.264)
mercosur   -0.23     -0.52     0.03  
    (0.241)     (0.317)     (0.322)  
nafta     0.81***     0.49     1.00***
      (0.246)     (0.377)     (0.331)
R² within 0.666 0.675 0.752 0.540 0.577 0.565 0.514 0.514 0.625
Number of countries=4
Number of observations=40
* indicates a 10% level of significance, ** indicates a 5% level of significance,
*** indicates a 1% level of significance.
Data inside brackets are standard deviation.
1. The FDI equation
The variable GDP exhibits a high degree of statistical significance in regression (1),
(2) and (3). The GDP coefficients have a positive sign, which is consistent with empirical FDI
literature compiled in appendix C. Besides, we notice that the market size coefficient is quiet
important relative to other ones.
In contrast, AGG and LCOST are not significant. The negative sign observed for AGG
may come from stronger competition effects prevailing over positive externalities. Our14
macroeconomic, rather than a sector based perspective, may probably explain it: positive
externalities such as for vertical links are better assessed at the sector level.
Although LCOST is not significant, it deserves a further commentary because it
records a non-intuitive sign. This sign may reflect an efficiency-seeking strategy. American
companies seem to be looking for skilled labour force endowed with higher productivity and
therefore higher wage cost locations. In our study, we must not overlook the role of Canada
where nominal wages are very high. Indeed, Canada is the major recipient of the U.S. (see
table 2).
The consequences of economic integration are not so clear. The variable TB is positive
and significant. A decrease in tariff barriers pushes downward U.S. FDI, which confirms
tariff-jumping and export platform motives. However, because we have no way to separate
the internal trade barriers effect from the external trade barriers one, we cannot conclude that
this tariff barrier effect is equally predominant both in the NAFTA and in the MERCOSUR.
As dummy variables suggest, the tariff barrier impact is perhaps more relevant for the
MERCOSUR than for the NAFTA. Moreover, theoretical arguments could lend further
support to this suggestion. The U.S. outsider can benefit from both tariff-jumping and export
platform motives by locating in the MERCOSUR. It takes profit of preferential access to
other markets within the regional area, which probably makes it more sensible to bilateral
U.S.–MERCOSUR trade barriers. But when bilateral U.S.–intra NAFTA trade barriers vary,
only the tariff jumping argument plays.
Now we consider the variable NAFTA. It is significantly positive. Institutional
commitment following economic integration, notably for the participation of Mexico in the
NAFTA, could give more credibility to government policies towards foreign companies.
Thus, it can attract foreign investors looking for stability
24. The Brady Plan implemented in
Mexico in 1989 may also have contributed to the recovery of investors' confidence by
improving the credibility of macroeconomic policies (Berthélemy and Girardin, 1993).
In the opposite, the MERCOSUR dummy has a non significant negative impact. It
could be certainly too hazardous to conclude that the MERCOSUR has no repercussion on
U.S. FDI. Firstly, companies may have anticipated the economic outcomes of institutional
integration. Secondly, economic integration could boost FDI indirectly through an increasing
                                               
24 Political stability constitutes a necessary condition for the international division of labour at the firm level
(Blomtröm and Kokko (1997)). It could stimulate vertical FDI.15
market size (growing GDP in parallel with greater export flows and economic openness) or
better labour productivity (lower internal or X-inefficiency because of increasing competitive
pressures).
However, these dissimilar results shed light insider vs. outsider effect. The U.S.
distinct position with regard to the two agreements seems to matter. From the U.S. insider
perspective, the NAFTA expands the U.S. market by including Canadian and Mexican
market. Economic integration is likely to prompt U.S. firms to rationalize and relocate their
factory. Indeed, U.S. firms are now able to serve these three markets from one single
productive base.
There is also another noteworthy finding. We perform a Chow test. It yields a not
significant F statistic equal to 0.517. Splitting sample into two groups (i.e. NAFTA versus
MERCOSUR members) over our entire period does not raise the statistical explanatory power
of the regression. Our F statistic testing the restricted versus unrestricted model is inferior to
the tabled critical value. Then, we may not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient vectors
are identical in the two data samples. The MERCOSUR and NAFTA membership partition of
dataset does not change the estimated coefficients of U.S. FDI location determinants.
Although NAFTA and MERCOSUR dummies show dissimilar impacts, estimating data
separately does not significantly modify the FDI sensibility to the different macroeconomic
determinants.
2. The Cross-Border M&A versus Greenfield Investment equations
Comparing the results between columns (4) to (9) and columns (1) to (3), FDI, M&A
and G.I. clearly response differently to our independent variables. Only the market size is
always significant for both entry modes. We find a positive relationship between GDP and the
dependant variable.
The AGG variable still remains not significant both for G.I. and M&A except in
column (5). International buyers appear to be slightly more sensible to agglomeration effects.
Competition effects discourage them from locating in a local market. In constrat, several U.S.
investors establish new plants in the Latin American countries to exploit less expensive labour
costs. They then get back cheap intermediate goods in the U.S. before re-exporting final
goods overseas. Therefore, it should make this kind of G.I. less sensible to agglomeration
effects.16
A different interpretation could be proposed. Indeed, this AGG variable may also give
information on the relative scarcity of purchasable host country firms. When this variable
goes up, it could mean that the available pool of local companies, i.e. investment
opportunities, shrinks. It may constitute an additional friction factor refraining U.S.
companies from buying over local firms (mismatching between local offer and foreign
demand, upward pressure on acquisition prices in the market for corporate control, etc.).
In both cases, labour costs coefficients are never significant. Nevertheless, we notice
that LCOST shows negative signs for G.I. As a result, our efficiency-seeking strategy
assumption pursued by U.S. companies could be only relevant for M&A. For instance, during
the 1990s in the Mexican automobile sector, U.S. companies established maquiladoras (G.I.)
to achieve an extensive production. They did not really search for skilled workers (no
Research and Development expenditures). They just needed sufficiently educated labour force
to be productive and able to use machines. However, such a conclusion must be again made
with serious caution since labour cost variable is not significant.
Finally, we again investigate the effects of economic integration. First, the TB signs
are significant and positive in columns (4), (6) and (9) confirming the results observed for
aggregated FDI. They have lesser magnitude for G.I. and are generally more significant in the
case of M&A. These results are partly consistent with our theoretical model. Indeed, M&A
could be more concerned by tariff barriers. Trade barriers theoretically could alter not only the
profit earned by a local firm once acquired, but also the acquisition price level.
Second, the NAFTA dummy has a positive and significant influence only G.I. It
indicates that M&A respond less strongly to institutional integration than G.I. Such
observation can be regarded as a consequence of Maquiladoras spreading in Mexico in the
1990s. It sheds light on the U.S. interest in enlarging a trade area to the Mexican market. If
U.S. and Canada already came to agreements on trade and investment with the CUFSTA in
1989, Mexico adopted a large part of new rules favourable to U.S. affiliates in the NAFTA
framework.
In the opposite, the MERCOSUR variable is never significant confirming again an
intra versus inter-regional integration contrast. By belonging to a common trade area, a
country may give rise to a pulling force of insiders’ investments.17
Finally, the Chow test
25 indicates again that separating countries into two distinct
samples is not relevant in both entry modes.
V. Conclusion
The purpose of our article is twofold. On the one hand, we explore the effects of a
deeper American continent integration and the insider vs. outsider position on U.S. FDI
location patterns. We control for other traditional macroeconomic determinants prevailing in a
host country. On the second hand, we wonder whether G.I. and cross-border M&A respond in
a similar way to location determinants.
Two main findings stand out. Firstly, only the market size and trade barriers have a
positive impact on the location of FDI, G.I. and M&A. Multinational firms try to “jump”
tariff barriers to avoid too high exporting costs. Export platform motives may also be
identified. As for the major role of the market size on FDI location choices, it certainly
emphasizes the indirect impact of economic integration. Indeed, the market size grows with
the progressive access to other markets. In contrary, in our macroeconomic study,
agglomeration and labour costs do not affect significantly FDI flows.
Secondly, the NAFTA dummy sign is significant and positive only for U.S.
aggregated FDI and G.I. This variable reveals the influence of NAFTA rules on trade and
investment on FDI patterns. It shows to what extent the ensuing institutional commitment has
driven foreign investors searching for political and institutional stability to establish domestic
affiliates in Canada and Mexico.
However, the MERCOSUR agreement has had no impact. Such a finding puts forward
an insider vs. outsider position effect. In the prospect of the formation of a free trade area in
the American continent (the FTAA) by 2005, newly insider countries such as Argentina or
Brazil could expect to attract U.S. companies. This effect could overcome the opposite tariff
jumping effect and/or export platform motives. The FTAA impact is likely to be weaker for
the already insider countries such as Canada or Mexico.
However, as Chow tests results point out, the FTAA formation could not modify the
sensibility of U.S. location decisions to macroeconomic country parameters.
                                               
25 The F statistics yielded by M&A and G.I. data are respectively 1.088 and 0.908. None of these statistics are
significant.18
Finally, both our empirical study and our theoretical Cournot model highlight the need
to distinguish G.I. from M&A when studying FDI determinants. We have no reason to see
entry modes responding similarly to a change in the host country economic environment.
Moreover, such reactions are likely to be differentiated by their location of origin. These
distinctions are important because these two entry modes may also exercise different
consequences on the host country welfare.
Appendix A: Data description and sources
Number of G.I., M&A and affiliates (Source: BEA-Survey of Current Business, CEP).
Our data on the number of majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFA's)
26 are available for the
four countries. Data on the number of G.I. and cross-border M&A are only known for
Canada, Brazil and Mexico. We are very grateful to Raymond Mataloni for having given
them to us. Data for Argentina has been provided by the CEP
27
GDP (Source: CHELEM CD-Rom, Cepii): GDP is in million US dollar 1995.
Labour costs (Source: ILO yearbook of labour statistics): they correspond to men and
women wages evaluated in US millions per wage earner for one hour (except for Brazil
28 ) in
economic activity.
Tariff barriers (Source: TRAINS CD-Rom, Cnuced): it consists of bilateral tariff rates
for developing and industrial countries.
                                               
26 MOFA's are foreign affiliates in which the combined ownership of all U.S. parents exceeds 50 percent.
27 We thank the director of the CEP (Argentina Ministery of Economy), Ricardo Rozemberg, for his help.19





FDI 16 13.46 2 65
M&A 8.22 6.89 1 28
GI 7.77 8.1 1 37
GDP 434039.5 183364.4 188057 747050
AGG 826.6 701.62 148 2072
LCOST 23.58 102.26 0.01 496.98
TB 9.38 4.5 0.56 15.98
Authors'calculations
                                                                                                                                                  
28 In Brazil case, wages are calculated per employee per month.20
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